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Abstract 
The security of drinking water is increasingly being recognized as a major challenge for municipalities and water utilities. In the 
event of a contamination, water spreads rapidly before the problem is detected. Contaminated drinking water can induce major 
epidemics, disrupt economic life and create mass panics. 
SAFEWATER is an EU-funded project that aims at developing a comprehensive event detection and event management solution 
for drinking water security management. The implemented solution will rely on new and currently existing sensors. A number of 
innovative software components will capture and analyze the data collected by the sensors, trigger alerts when anomalies are 
detected, and enable prediction of the contamination spread and its source. A web-based decision support tool will facilitate 
situation awareness and support the execution of mitigation measures. 
This paper focuses on the software architecture that enables coordinated operation of the event detection, simulation modules and 
the decision support application.  
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of CCWI 2015. 
Keywords: CBRN; Drinking Water; Decision Support; Software Architecture 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +49-721-6091-562; fax: +49-721-6091-413. 
E-mail address: juergen.mossgraber@iosb.fraunhofer.de 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of CCWI 2015
320   Eduard Santamaria et al. /  Procedia Engineering  119 ( 2015 )  319 – 327 
1. Introduction 
The safety and or security of drinking water can be threatened by natural disasters, accidents or malevolent 
attacks. Due to these hazards the safety of drinking water is increasingly being recognized as a major challenge for 
municipalities and water utilities, there is growing need for systems that support the prevention and management of 
water contamination events. A main goal of the SAFEWATER project is to develop a centralized events 
management system to support water utilities in the detection, processing and response to different types of events 
related to water supply and sewage [1]. 
An event is any reported incident received at the operational center that requires handling and continued follow 
up until its conclusion. Such events may be produced due to incidents in the water and sewage networks, most 
importantly CBRN contamination and water quality related, but may also include maintenance, client complains and 
security (e.g., intrusion detection). 
The main components of the architecture are the Event Management System (EMS), the Event Detection System 
(EDS) and several Simulator modules. Infrastructure components, such as a Geographic Information System, a 
message broker and a workflow engine are also integrated to support the implementation of the required capabilities. 
The EMS is conceived as a generic system able to manage a wide range of events. However, in the 
SAFEWATER project, a great emphasis is placed on the quality of water and on ensuring safety for the consumers. 
The main functions of the EMS include collecting alerts, providing situational awareness by presenting the active 
events together with the results from the simulation models, and supporting response tasks using automated 
workflows. The EMS is implemented as a web-based solution, available to connected desktop and mobile devices. 
The EDS is based on machine learning un-supervised algorithm. The implementation of the EDS includes three 
stages: (1) The Learning stage is based on a filtered training data set (data set for which bad data was excluded). The 
system learns the “Normal behavior” of the water system. (2) The Testing stage evaluates a tagged data set where 
abnormal events have been classified by experts. This test yields estimation about the amount of True Positive, False 
Positive, False Negative and True Negative the system yields. (3) The Monitoring stage finally observes real time 
data to produce alerts. The alerts are tagged by operators. This tagging mechanism enables to raise an alert when a 
water quality event occurs. In parallel, when the performance of the system deteriorates, users may perform 
additional learning and testing with updated data.  
Hydraulic and water quality state estimations of the drinking water distribution systems are provided by the 
simulators. In an offline context, the simulators will be able to run different what-if scenarios to evaluate the 
consequences of potential contamination events happening in the system. In an online context, the simulators will 
feed a water network model with quasi real time sensor measurements and operation information in order to make 
simulations closer to the real system under analysis.  
Simulator actions are managed by the EMS considering the results coming from the EDS. In case a 
contamination/anomalous event is detected, the look-ahead phase of the simulator will be activated in order to show 
the development in time of the contamination/anomalous event regarding water quality. The look-ahead calculation 
starts from the online simulation state and looks into the future to analyze and present results about what will happen 
in the next hours in the network from a hydraulic and quality point of view. 
This paper focuses on the software architecture of the system currently being developed. 
2. Related Work 
The United States EPA maintains a Water Security web portal with numerous resources related to the topic. Of 
special interest regarding the SAFEWATER project is the Response Protocol Toolbox (RPTB), which consists of 
several modules covering topics such as water utility planning, contamination threat management and public health 
response [2]. 
Besides recommendations from official agencies, the literature on information systems for disaster response 
management also provides guidelines for the design of such systems [3, 4, 5]. A number of common aspects that 
characterize emergency response situations are identified and design principles to develop decision support systems 
accordingly are layout. 
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The European project TRIDEC [6], focused on new approaches and technologies for intelligent geo-information 
management in complex and critical decision-making processes in Earth sciences. The project focused on other 
domains than safety of drinking water but the technical workflow was similar. Sensors provide the system with 
events, which need to be analyzed and aggregated to support decision makers in a crisis. A result of the work in 
TRIDEC, together with other past projects, has been the Fusion4Decision framework [7]. The Fusion4Decision 
framework identifies three architectural layers, which respectively deal with data acquisition, storage and 
processing, and decision support. Different communication buses enable communications between the components 
at the different layers. In SAFEWATER, the Fusion4Decision reference architecture is reused and adapted to the 
needs of the project. 
In parallel to SAFEWATER, two related European projects are currently executed: TAWARA RTM [12] aims at 
developing a complete platform to control the quality of the tap water with respect to the radioactivity content. ISIS 
[13] to enhance public security by developing an advanced monitoring system for drinking water networks that 
instantly detects chemical or biological contamination and gives a clear indication of the risk level. Both research 
similar aspects as SAFEWATER but do not focus on a holistic event management for a crisis. 
3. System Requirements 
In this section, the main functional and non-functional requirements of the system are presented. The main 
functional requirements of the system include: 
1. Enable the operational dispatchers of the water utility to manage water and sewage events through all event 
phases: detection, simulation, decision, response, coordination and post-event debriefing. 
2. Provide authentication mechanisms to control access to the system functions. 
3. Collect data from multiple sources (manual input, EDS, SCADA, security system …) to fulfil the 
informational needs of event management. 
4. Supply event related information to other systems, e.g., a third party ERP system. 
5. Analyze incident location to: 
a. Detect nearby incidents that could potentially be the same or serviced together. 
b. Detect recurring events in a specific area. 
6. Allow information dissemination and input gathering to/from workers in the field through an interface 
adapted to mobile devices. 
7. Display active events on a virtual control panel and on a map display. 
8. Send notifications through e-mail, SMS and fax. In general, provide communication mechanisms to 
exchange information within the company, contractors, customers and organizations involved in event 
response. 
9. Generate reports and statistics. 
10. Configure and trigger simulations for training purposes. 
11. Automatically execute model-based simulations based on collected data to determine severity, origin and 
spread of an on-going contamination event. 
12. Display the results of the simulations on the GIS map. 
 
Besides the functional requirements, a number of non-functional requirements are also identified: 
1. Provide the necessary flexibility to adapt to specific requirements of different water utilities. 
2. Allow extensibility and accommodate future changes. 
3. Provide an intuitive user interface with minimal training needs. 
4. Detect a high percentage of potential contamination events. 
5. Provide a warning within a period in the order of minutes after initial signs of potential contamination are 
found. 
6. Execute and provide the results of online simulations, based on collected data, in a period in the order of 
minutes. 
7. Produce a minimal/acceptable amount of false alarms. 
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8. Require minimal maintenance, e.g., calibration. 
9. Integrate mechanisms to evaluate its sensitivity, false alarm rates, detection times and other important 
parameters. 
4. System Architecture 
Figure 1 depicts the main components of the SAFEWATER system. The Event Management System (EMS) 
provides the front-end for the user interaction and is responsible for managing the lifecycle of events. When a new 
event is received, the EMS triggers the execution of the corresponding workflow. Workflows describe the sequence 
of actions that need to be carried out in a machine-readable format. The workflow engine is responsible for carrying 
out their execution. 
For improved situation awareness, a GIS client provides a visual representation of the network on top of a city 
map. New events will be marked on this map, which will also be used to visually display the results of the 
simulations. A GIS server will support these functions by providing the maps and facilitating access to the water 
network data and result values through OGC standard protocols, such as WMS and WMF [8]. 
Data coming from the SCADA systems is stored into a relational database (storage component). The Event 
Detection System (EDS) provides the intelligence to detect anomalies that could reveal a contamination event based 
on the collected data. The simulation component uses the same input data to perform model-based computations to 
estimate the contamination sources and predict the contamination spread. The results are also stored in relational 
form and accessed by the GIS server to enable their visualization. 
 
A mixture of communication mechanisms are used to enable interaction between the different modules. The GIS 
server is accessed using standardized OGC interfaces based on HTTP. Access to the storage component is 
performed using the connectors available for the development languages used by the different partners (mostly Java 
and C#). In order to feed the system with SCADA data, scripts are used which run when the data, which water 
utilities are exporting at regular intervals, becomes available. Regarding the communication infrastructure between 
the EDS, the EMS and simulators, a Message oriented Middleware (MoM) has been chosen (see Figure 2). 
Figure 1 Architecture overview with main components and relationships 
between them. 
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A MoM provides several advantages in contrast to a tight coupling of module integration with direct function 
calls: 
x Loose Coupling: This helps to make components of a system easier replaceable. 
x Parallel Processing: Multiple instances of a component can deal with messages in parallel and therefore, 
speed up the processing process and deliver results earlier. 
x Distribution: Components of the system can be distributed over several computers to make more 
processing power available. 
To implement the MoM in SAFEWATER the open source product Apache ActiveMQ [9] was adapted. 
ActiveMQ also provides a user interface for manually sending messages for testing purposes. 
5. Response to a water quality event 
In this section, the roles and interactions between the different components of the system are further clarified by 
describing the system response to a water quality event generated by the EDS. The main steps involved in such 
scenario are listed below: 
1. Monitoring and analysis of SCADA data  
2. Notify EMS about event detection 
3. Visualization of events 
4. Start response workflow 
5. Start simulation(s) 
6. Display simulation results 
5.1. Monitoring and analysis of SCADA data 
The implementation of the EDS, carried out by DecisionMakers and called “Mindset-Detector”, is based on a 
detection model. A brief overview of the steps involved to produce and tune the model follows: 
x Define variables: A model is a set of variables, which are related to each other and is used for the 
detection process. In the first step, this list of variables should be identified and characterized. 
x Load Data: Once the model structure has been defined, data may be loaded. 
x Learn: Learn is the process, which turns data into knowledge. During this stage the EDS generates the 
following:  
o Statistical limits for each variable. 
o Rare and common data table combination (labeled as Similarity table). 
o Data topology (Dynamic changes) 
Once Similarity and Topology have been created, user may choose to classify some of the combinations 
(either as Good or Hazard). 
x Define Rule: A rule is a Boolean expression, which describes some conditions using a SQL type 
expression. A rule may capture some engineering knowhow. Rules may be used for the detection of 
events. 
Figure 2 The main components of the system are decoupled via a MoM. 
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x Define Detectors: The Detectors are the main elements of the Mindset-Detector. These are a set of 
several algorithms. Each one of them is trained to detect a specific problem. Some detectors are related 
to single variables. Some to multiple variables. A model may contain many detectors. Together they are 
able to identify events of abnormality. 
x Tune Model: Detectors have to be tuned. Tuning is a process in which the user (manually or 
automatically with the assistance of the software) selects optimal parameters for each detector. 
x Test (Validation): Testing a model is a process in which the model is asked to monitor a new set of data. 
During this procedure the model may detect (or miss) an abnormal event. The actual nature of the test 
dataset should be known to the user and may be supplied as a classification file. Given the result of the 
run and compared to the classification file, the test procedure generates counts for True Positive, True 
Negative, False Positive and False Negative Events. These four numbers are turned into a single 
measurement (between -1 to 1) which gives the quality detection of the model. The results of the test are 
stored in the model history tables in the database. 
x Activate: If the results of the test are satisfied, it is up to the user to activate the mode. An activated 
model may be used during runtime by the Mindset Server to monitor incoming data. 
5.2. Notification of event detection to the EMS 
The EDS relies on a component called Mindset-Detector Server (MDS) to communicate with the “outside 
world”. The MDS transfers messages using the queue mechanism provided by the MoM. Three types of queues are 
created: 
x Default request/response queues 
x A default outgoing queue 
x A user-dedicated response queue 
The Request Queue is a message queue, which enables any user to submit data requests to the MDS. The 
Response Queue is a message queue, which is used by the MDS to answer requests submitted to the request Queue. 
During the MDS initialization process, the existence of these queues is checked. In the case of an absence, they are 
created. 
The MDS is constantly monitoring the Request Queue for messages and, once a request has been submitted, the 
proper request is processed and the results are placed in the Response Queue.  
The messages structure includes identification fields that enable the user to identify messages in a unique manner.  
The MDS monitors the Response Queue for unhandled messages. Messages that remain in the queue for more 
than 1 hour (as a default time that can be configured) are purged.  
Default outgoing queue 
The MDS manages a default outgoing queue. This queue contains messages that are generated by the MDS as 
result of different events, e.g. identification of an abnormal event. The MDS setup process enables the definition of 
which events data are reflected in the default outgoing queue.  
User-dedicated response queue 
Any user may request that the MDS generate a dedicated response queue for him/her. Generating such a queue is 
carried out by entering a proper request in the default request queue. Once such a queue has been generated, the user 
may direct any message request to this queue. The existence of a dedicated response queue does not exclude the 
option of using the default response queue. It has no effect on the default outgoing queue. Asking for a dedicated 
queue is performed by using properties in the message header, as explained later. 
5.3. Visualization of events 
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The EMS listens to one of the EDS managed queues to receive event notifications. When a notification arrives, it 
is automatically presented to the user. The user can visualize the events either in a table view, which provides 
filtering and sorting options, or as markers on a map (see Figure 3). 
Both tables and maps may contain a combination of automatic and manually introduced events. 
The EMS is based on WebGenesis® [10], the Framework for generation of and support for Web-based 
Information systems. WebGenesis® is developed by Fraunhofer IOSB and provides several features to build 
information systems for knowledge management and decision support. 
Geospatial data, such as the water network layout, is obtained from the GIS server. The software selected to set 
up the GIS Server is GeoServer [11], which provides an open source solution that implements OGC standards. 
5.4. Start response workflow 
In the current phase of the project, the development efforts are focused in the integration of the main system 
components, namely the EMS, the EDS and the simulators, together with support tools like the GIS components and 
database management system. At this point, the response workflow contains only the steps to start the simulation. 
Support for more complex workflows with additional actions, like notifications to external systems, will be 
addressed in the upcoming months.  
5.5. Start simulation(s) 
As noted above, the communication between the EMS and the simulators is based on ActiveMQ. On the side of 
the simulators, 3S has implemented the so-called ActiveMQ-DataConnector Plugin as part of its Sir OPC software. 
Using this Plugin the integration of the online simulator with the Event Management System (EMS) is realized, 
making it possible to send commands from the EMS to the online simulation and receive the responses generated by 
the latter. 
Figure 3 The EMS presents events both in table form and as markers on a map. 
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There is only one single interface to the simulation software required. The desired functionality is activated by 
the specific message representing a command. Three commands have been implemented for the communication 
between the EMS and the offline Simulator module. The function GetModels() delivers a list of available models 
that can be run for the offline simulation use cases. With Init() the simulation engine is prompted to load one of the 
models of the model list into memory waiting for the Start() that initiates the simulation (see Figure 4). 
The functions Init() and Start() can be used both for offline and online simulations. The difference in the online 
case is that between the single time steps of the calculation the boundary conditions of the model must be updated 
by actual SCADA data. 
The Sir OPC software is also capable of managing different calculations at the same time. Therefore, for each 
specific calculation a Process Plugin has to be implemented. The connection between the online data is realized by a 
mapping between general online data and the process data. For example, the control for starting a pump can be 
represented by a SCADA ID for the pump status (On/Off). If in the real physical system the pump is switched on the 
status might change from “0” to “1”. The Data Connector Plugin defines a mapping from the SCADA ID to the 
central Sir OPC online data. A correct mapping between the central online data and the process Plugin guarantees 
that the signal pump switches from off to on is also received by the simulator.  
Different Plugins can share the same online data. The EMS as the leading component is able to start and stop 
different processes like, for example, look-ahead simulations, source identification etc. (see Figure 2 14).  
The exchange of data is performed via the system’s storage component. Only the commands and 
completion/error notifications are transferred via ActiveMQ. The communication of the simulators module with 
other components than the EMS is also realized using the ActiveMQ interface and the database. For example, if an 
alarm is released by the EDS, the particular sensor and time that released the alarm must be available in the 
database. The EMS informs the Simulator module that an online source identification calculation is required. The 
Source Identification has access to the sensor data module via SIR OPC data connector.  
If all simulation modules run cyclic on a regular timeframe, the messages that have to be transferred between the 
EMS and the simulator module can be minimized. In this case, the previously described three commands from the 
offline simulations are sufficient. 
Figure 4 Concept for managing multiple simulations. Messages are delivered through the MoM and dispatched by the 
Listener. 
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5.6. Display of Simulation Results 
The simulation results (in case of both offline and online simulations) are written into the storage module and the 
EMS is notified about its availability. From there the EMS can always read the results of the last simulation run or 
time step in the online case. 
To present the results, the system relies on GeoServer’s ability to query a relational database with GIS extensions 
and process the returned rows to generate a graphical representation. More specifically, the GIS server retrieves the 
simulation results using a parameterized query and generates a colored representation of the water network, where 
each color represents a range of values between certain thresholds. The result is transferred to the GIS client and 
presented on the web interface. 
6. Conclusion 
In this article, the architecture of the SAFEWATER system for the detection and mitigation of CBRN related 
contamination events has been presented. The components of the system together with the underlying infrastructure 
enabling their communication are presented. The way in which the different components interact is described 
through a response to a water quality event scenario. 
In the current status of the project, all components are in-place and functional, which means there is a good basis 
for further development during the remaining time of the project. The main areas of work in the upcoming months 
will include fine-tuning of the detection tools and simulators, improved integration between the system components, 
and the extension and refinement of the available workflows and the user interface. 
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